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ADVANCING FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES THROUGH
DOCTRINE AND PRACTICE: COMMENTS ON DARRYL
ROBINSON, JUSTICE IN EXTREME CASES
Alexander K.A. Greenawalt*
I am honored to comment on Darryl Robinson's terrific new book which makes
an extraordinary contribution to the literature on international criminal law (ICL).1
Already an admirer of Robinson's work, I learned a lot from reading his book and
find his approach convincing. Broadly speaking, there is not much, if anything, on
which I disagree with Robinson. I share his criticisms of international criminal
tribunal reasoning. 2 I welcome the call for greater attention to deontic
considerations.' I agree on the importance of the fundamental principles that
Robinson identifies, and I also agree that justifying these principles does not require
consensus on moral foundations. 4 At the same time, his analysis raises complex
questions about the interpretation, application, and practical significance of these
fundamental principles for a project focused on the reform of ICL. It is these
questions that are the focus of my comments.
One of the great contributions of Robinson's book is the attention he devotes
to justifying and defending fundamental principles that are often taken for granted
or treated casually.5 Robinson makes a compelling case that international tribunal
case law must take greater account of deontic considerations, and the jurisprudence
would benefit from a careful reading of Robinson's work. A more difficult question
concerns the practical implications for doctrinal substance. Three complications, in
particular, come to mind. One concerns the relationship between published judicial
reasoning and the resulting doctrinal decisions. Another concerns the contested
interpretation and understanding of the fundamental principles. The third concerns
the limitations of formal doctrine as a vehicle to vindicate fundamental principles. I
elaborate upon these concerns through consideration of three modes of individual
responsibility that have proven controversial in ICL: joint criminal enterprise (JCE),
aiding and abetting, and command responsibility.
Robinson himself devotes substantial attention only to the third of these
doctrines, but all three raise problems that benefit from the framework that Robinson
provides. Hence, my purpose in discussing JCE and aiding and abetting alongside
command responsibility is not primarily to debate Robinson's own conclusions

*

Professor of Law, Elisabeth Haub School of Law, Pace University.

1. DARRYL ROBINSON, JUSTICE IN EXTREME CASES: CRIMINAL LAW THEORY MEETS
INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW (2020).

2. See, e.g., id. at 15.
3. See, e.g., id. at 11.
4. See generally id. at 85-118.
5. See id. at 22-23 (noting that ICL jurists have often treated fundamental principles as
doctrinal rules without engaging in deontic reasoning).
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about those topics but instead to consider the implications of his broader approach
for some of the most contested questions of substantive ICL.
I. JCE
First announced by the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former
Yugoslavia (ICTY) Appeals Chamber in the Prosecutor v. Tadit case, the doctrine
of JCE holds responsible all members of a criminal enterprise for all crimes
committed pursuant to the enterprise so long as the offenses in question were either
part of the common plan or a reasonably foreseeable result of that plan.6 All JCE
members are held responsible whether or not they had any role in the particular
crime.' It is enough that they share in the goals of the JCE, make some contribution
to the common plan, and possess (according to the extended "JCE-III" mode of
participation) at least a form of recklessness (dolus eventualis) toward the prohibited
result.8 On this basis, the ICTY Appeals Chamber convicted Dusko Tadi6 on five
counts of murder committed during an action to ethnically cleanse a village. The
Court found that Tadi6 had participated in the common plan to attack the village, but
there was no finding that he had any involvement in the murders or that murder was
part of the common plan.9
This approach to JCE ranks among the most debated aspects of the ICTY's
legacy. Although JCE is not the focus of Robinson's book, he does give the doctrine
brief analysis, summarizing common critiques and highlighting JCE as a departure
from the fundamental principles he defends. 10 JCE raises concerns for me as well,
but the question of whether and how it violates fundamental principles is a
complicated one. Consider some criticisms suggested by Robinson's analysis.
One concern relates to legality. Robinson notes that "JCE was developed by
Tribunaljudges, and it is far broader than any of the modes of liability actually listed
in the Tribunal Statutes."11 Given this apparent lack of statutory authorization,
perhaps the ICTY should have refused to convict Tadi6 of murder no matter how
strong the moral case for conviction might or might not have been. That is certainly
a defensible argument, but it is also one that raises a deeper concern about the ICTY.
Apart from specific provisions for superior responsibility and separate treatment of
some discrete issues like official capacity and superior orders, the ICTY Statute
dedicates only a few words to criminal responsibility. It states merely that "[a]
person who planned, instigated, ordered, committed or otherwise aided and abetted
in the planning, preparation or execution of a crime referred to in articles 2 to 5 of
the present Statute, shall be individually responsible for the crime." 1 2 Even for basic

6. See Case No. IT-94-1-A, Appeal Judgment, ¶¶ 227-28 (Int'l Crim. Trib. for the Former
Yugoslavia July 15, 1999) (outlining the elements of JCE).
7. Id. ¶227.
8. Id. ¶¶ 204, 227-28.
9. Id. ¶¶230-32.
10. ROBINSON, supra note 1, at 249-52.
11. Id. at 34.
12. Updated Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia art. 7,
¶ 1, Sep. 2009 [hereinafter ICTY Statute].
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modes of liability like aiding and abetting or the most basic forms of commission,
the Statute lacks guidance on critical questions like mens rea, levels of contribution,
affirmative defenses, degrees of guilt, and so forth. A strict defender of the legality
principle might therefore have objected that all ICTY charges should have resulted
in acquittal given the statute's general failure to conform with minimum
requirements of legality.
Another view, by contrast, dictates that legality values are more flexible. While
greater specificity in the law may be preferable, many of the details of criminal
responsibility are necessarily left to judicial elaboration. Under this view, JCE
becomes more defensible: international law lays out basic rules of individual
culpability and, as in many national legal systems, the case law elaborates on the
details of how exactly one may commit a crime. 13 Incidentally, this framework also
resolves the apparent contradiction that Robinson highlights in the dual claim that
the ICTY adhered to existing customary international law (CIL) while also making
significant developments to the law." The most plausible account of CIL-at least
with respect to ICL-is that international law often lays out basic rules and
principles while entrusting much to judicial elaboration. In that sense, it may well
be that the only way for international tribunals to follow CIL is through judicial
development, although certainly I agree with Robinson that the tribunals have not
always been forthright about how that dynamic works.
This observation highlights a second possible objection to JCE: that the Court
derived the doctrine from poor reasoning, relying excessively on sources and
teleological reasoning among other factors to the exclusion of deontic
considerations. Robinson masterfully documents the fallacies of the tribunal case
law, much of it betraying a sort of international-law exceptionalism that places too
much weight on the special circumstances and goals of ICL and too little weight on
core criminal law values." But it is also noteworthy that the final result of that
process-the extended JCE doctrine-is almost a mirror of the Pinkerton approach
developed by U.S. federal courts and several U.S. states according to which
conspirators become responsible for reasonably foreseeable crimes committed by
their co-conspirators.16 That correspondence begs the question of whether the
doctrine is actually the result of the published reasoning, or whether the reasoning is

13. I have previously explored this dynamic in the context of aiding and abetting. See
Alexander K.A. Greenawalt, Foreign Assistance Complicity, 54 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 531,
563 (2016) ("[R]eliance on World War II-era precedents cannot serve as a substitute for normative
analysis, especially regarding the limits of criminal responsibility."). With respect to ICL more
generally, see Alexander K.A. Greenawalt, The PluralismofInternationalCriminalLaw, 86 IND.
L.J. 1064, 1071 (2011) (advancing account of ICL according to which ICL leaves many questions
of criminal liability undetermined).
14. ROBINSON, supra note 1, at 38 ("[A]t the same time as the ICTY insisted that it
scrupulously applies only rules that are 'beyond any doubt customary international law,' it also
took credit for having 'expanded the boundaries of international humanitarian and international
criminal law."') (footnotes omitted).
15. See generally id. at 20-54 (exploring the "identity crisis" of ICL).
16. Pinkerton v. United States, 328 U.S. 640 (1946); see Prosecutor v. Tadi6, Case No. IT-941-A, Appeal Judgment, ¶ 224 n.289 (Int'l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia July 15, 1999)
(citing Pinkerton and other cases adopting this approach).

82

TEMPLE INT'L & COMPAR. L.J.

[35.1

merely the Court's attempt to justify its preferred result by reference to the
methodologies which it believes will most comport with the legality principle. In
that event, is it the reasoning that matters most? Or is it the final result?
Robinson provides a partial answer to the question with a compelling argument
for why "reasoning matters." 17 He allows that "[a] judgment might employ
problematic reasoning and still reach a defensible result," but warns that "replication
of faulty structure of arguments will eventually produce faulty outcomes." 18 "Our
reasoning," he explains, "is our 'math,' and systemic distortions in our math will
eventually throw off our calculations in significant ways." 19 But my point about
judicial reasoning does not assume the same causal relation between process and
result. I am not concerned here with the case in which bad judicial reasoning happens
to produce the right conclusion. Instead, my point is that the published judicial
reasoning may not reflect the actual reasoning by which the judges reached their
conclusions. If I am correct about that, then the judge-made doctrine demands
separate consideration from the published reasoning even if one maintains that the
reasoning should reflect greater transparency about the importance of normative
reasons as opposed to source-based reasons.
A third objection goes to the substance of the JCE doctrine. A core critique of
JCE is that it violates the fundamental principles of culpability and fair labeling by
treating defendants like Tadi6 as guilty of crimes to which they did not contribute.20
The concern is a serious one, but the question is also complicated by the fact that
extended JCE-III liability does in fact capture a measure of culpability that would
be lost without the doctrine. To illustrate, imagine that Dusko Tadi6 had three
fictional siblings-Danica, Dragan, and Dejana-all involved in JCEs of their own.
1. Danica Tadi6 participates in a JCE to ethnically cleanse a village
during which she personally participates in the execution of five
villagers.
2. Dragan Tadi6 participates in a JCE to ethnically cleanse a village. He
does not participate in murder but knows that the execution of five
villagers is part of the plan.
3. Dusko Tadi6 (as actually found by the ICTY) participates in a JCE to
ethnically cleanse a village. Five villagers are murdered. Tadi6 does
not participate in the murders, and they are not part of the plan, but the
deaths are a foreseeable result of the plan (for which Tadi6 had a
culpable mental state of dolus eventualis, an analogue of
recklessness).
4. Dejana Tadi6 participates in a JCE to ethnically cleanse a village.
Murder is not part of the plan and no one is murdered.

17. ROBINSON, supra note 1, at 54.
18. Id.
19. Id.
20. See id. at 251 ("[With JCE] the accused need not perform any part of the actus reus of any
crime. The accused's acts need only to contribute to a common design. Thus a minor contribution
can trigger massive criminal liability.") (emphasis and footnote omitted); see also id at 255
(arguing that the ICTY's "teleological enthusiasm" in developing JCE-III strained both the legality
principle and other deontic constraints like culpability and fair labeling).
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What is the problem with convicting Dusko of murder as the ICTY did? One
objection, invoking both the principles of culpability and fair labeling, is that doing
so lumps him together with Dragan and Danica, who are more responsible for
homicide than he is. That is true. But Dusko is also more guilty than Dejana, who
bears no responsibility for homicide whatsoever. If Dusko is found not guilty of
murder, then Dejana can rightly complain that she is being held just as responsible
as Dusko even though his actions were worse. Moreover, Dragan has the same
complaint vis-a-vis Danica: he is more guilty of murder than Dusko but less so than
Danica. If the choice is a binary one of guilt versus innocence with respect to murder,
then inevitably differently situated persons will be lumped together into the same
category.
Perhaps, then, the problem is that we need more categories? Dusko could be
held responsible for a lesser form of homicide, such as manslaughter. I think that's
a better solution than treating him as a murderer, but there are also other ways to
take account of his relative culpability, for example through detailed factual findings
that accurately reflect and assess culpability and through sentencing discretion. And
even if manslaughter is the more "fair" label, there is a limit to how much labels can
accomplish. The label alone can never capture all the gradations of culpability
embodied by those to whom it applies. At what point do we say the fair labeling
principle has been violated? And does fair labeling necessarily privilege the label
offered by the category of offense over other types of labeling (such as the more
detailed findings in the judgment itself)? As these questions reveal, the formal
liability finding (i.e., "guilty of murder" pursuant to JCE-III) is only one component
of how the Court says what it has to say about the nature and consequences of the
accused's conduct.
Or maybe the problem, as Robinson suggests, is that the JCE doctrine treats
Dusko as a principal perpetrator of murder rather than as an accessory? 2 1 But
whether or not that distinction (which also plays a role in Robinson's consideration
of command responsibility)22 is crucial is more a matter of legal culture and doctrine
than of fundamental principles. In the United States, the principal/accessory
distinction is typically not imbued with any deep moral significance. For instance,
the U.S. Code collapses several categories of accessory liability into principal
liability when it provides that "[w]hoever commits an offense against the United
States or aids, abets, counsels, commands, induces or procures its commission, is
punishable as a principal." 23 The collapsing of these categories does not mean, for
example, that those who aid or abet are always as guilty as those who personally
commit the offense. They may be more or less so. But such distinctions are left to
sentencing rather than to formal labels. In other countries, by contrast, the
principal/accessory distinction has great moral significance, to the point that

21. See id. at 252 (maintaining that problematic aspect of JCE doctrine is that it deems an
accessory to have committed the crimes and to be equally guilty of those crimes regardless of the
size of the part they played and that it imposes principal liability on people who do not meet the
objective or subjective requirements that are usually necessary for principal liability).
22. See infra Part III.
23. 18 U.S.C. § 2(a) (2018).
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conviction as an accessory rather than a principal yields a significant reduction in
the maximum permitted sentence. 2 4 Predictably, these states also draw the line
between principals and accessories in different ways. For instance, the German
control theory-embraced by the International Criminal Court (ICC)-treats as
principals persons who would be considered accessories under the traditional
common law approach. 25 International criminal tribunals, for their part, have
discretionary sentencing with no automatic reduction for accessories. 26 Hence, the
principal/accessory distinction, in the formal sense, becomes purely one of fair
labeling. Whether or not it is fair to call Tadi6 a principal perpetrator of murder
depends upon what moral significance one attaches to that label. Is this really a
matter of fundamental principles or merely a case of labels lost in translation?
Another critique-perhaps the most serious one-relates not to the conviction
of Tadi6 himself but to the potentially sweeping scope of the doctrine used to convict
him. For example, the JCE framework creates the possibility of treating minor
participants in a vast JCE (say the ethnic cleansing of all of Bosnia) as mass
murderers.2 7 While the unusual circumstances typical of ICL cases may present this
problem with special frequency, the basic problem already exists in the United States
under the Pinkerton approach. For example, could a U.S.-based teenager who sells
drugs to others in a particular neighborhood be held responsible for a vast array of
crimes on the theory that he is a contributing member of a broad transnational
conspiracy tracing all the way back to El Chapo in Mexico? In some ways, the
problem is far worse in the United States than at the ICTY because conspiracy
liability-the trigger for the Pinkerton doctrine-applies to a much broader set of
offenses for which those convicted often receive longer sentences than those meted
out to worse offenders by the comparatively lenient international tribunals.28

24. See, e.g., Strafgesetzbuch [StGB] [Penal Code], §§ 27(2), 49(1), translation at
https://www.gesetze-im-intemet.de/englisch stgb/englisch stgb.html
(Ger.)
(mandating
substantial mitigation of sentence for aiders as compared to principals).
25. See Prosecutor v. Lubanga, ICC-01/04-01/06 A 5, Judgment on the Appeal of Mr Thomas
Lubanga Dyilo Against His Conviction, ¶ 7 (Dec. 1, 2014) ("A co-perpetrator is one who makes,
within the framework of a common plan, an essential contribution with the resulting power to
frustrate the commission of the crime."); see also Jens David Ohlin, Elies Van Sliedregt, & Thomas
Weigend, Assessing the Control-Theory, 26 LEIDEN J. INT'L L. 725, 728 ("[T]he [control] theory
expands the scope of perpetratorship to persons who are far removed from the scene of the crime
and do not personally perform any of the acts required by the offence definition."); id. at 726 (noting
the origins of control theory in German criminal law theory).
26. Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court art. 77, July 17, 1998, 2187 U.N.T.S.
38544 [hereinafter Rome Statute]; ICTY Statute, supra note 12, art. 24.
27. See ROBINSON, supra note 1, at 250-51 ("[T]he doctrine grew to apply atrocities across
an entire region, or even to a 'nationwide government-organized system,' or a 'vast criminal regime
comprising thousands of participants,' in which the persons actually committing crimes are
The accused's acts need only
'structurally or geographically remote from the accused.' . .
contribute to a common design. Thus a minor contribution can trigger massive criminal liability.")
(footnotes omitted).
28. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 371 (2018) (establishing the crime of conspiracy when two or more
people collude to commit any offense against the United States). On sentencing, see, for example,
Marc Mauer, Long-Term Sentences: Time to Reconsider the Scale of Punishment, 87 UMKC L.

REV. 113, 127 (2018) ("The vast use of long-term sentences in the U.S. is an anomaly by
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So applied, I agree that the JCE doctrine would violate fundamental principles
of justice. But does that conclusion require rejection of JCE or merely a doctrinal
reform? U.S. federal courts, for instance, have identified due process limits on the
reach of Pinkerton liability to those whose contributions are too insignificant and
attenuated. 29 This solution would appear to go a long way toward addressing
concerns about overcriminalization, but it also highlights a more central point about
the limits of criminal law doctrine because the hard work of determining whose
contributions are sufficiently substantial now falls to case-by-case adjudication
rather than a self-applying doctrinal label. As it happens, U.S. case law has thus far
made little of this limiting possibility, with the result that prevention of injustice is
often left to the morally imperfect vagaries of prosecutorial discretion and plea
bargaining.30
The importance of case-by-case adjudication to the application of general
doctrine also leads me to question how much we can separate the doctrine from
actual results. Is the fact that the JCE doctrine has the potential to create injustice
enough to justify the conclusion that it violates fundamental principles, considering
that Robinson does not allege actual injustice in any particular case? A
counterargument proceeds as follows: a justice system's commitment to
fundamental principles cannot be assessed by reference to formal culpability
principles alone because the potential for unjust application in individual cases will
always exist no matter how refined the doctrine is. Especially in the case of a
judicially created doctrine like JCE, we must therefore wait to see how the case law
actually confronts cases of potentially unjust application. Does the court then limit
the doctrine or find some other way to avoid the unjust result? Only then can we
comprehensively assess the system's commitment to fundamental principles.

II. AIDING AND

ABETTING

My next example is aiding and abetting. As with JCE, the tribunal case law in
this area exemplifies Robinson's concerns about insufficient deontic reasoning and
potentially sweeping liability. Yet again, the ultimate implications for fundamental
principles are less certain than might appear.
The key ICTY case is the Prosecutorv. Furundfijadecision, in which the Trial
Chamber identified the elements of aiding and abetting as they purportedly exist

international standards, and in line with the position of the United States broadly as a world leader
in its use of incarceration.") (footnote omitted). See Jens David Ohlin, ProportionalSentences at
the ICTY, in THE LEGACY OF THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL TRIBUNAL FOR THE FORMER

YUGOSLAVIA 322, 324 (Bert Stewart et al. eds., 2011) ("[I]t still strikes some observers that the
sentences handed down by the ICTY were surprisingly low, although perhaps in keeping with
evolving standards of decency that reign in European penal systems.") (footnote omitted).
29. See, e.g., Mark Noferi, Towards Attenuation: A "New " Due ProcessLimit on Pinkerton
ConspiracyLiability, 33 AM. J. CRIM. L. 91, 120-46 (2006) (surveying relevant cases).
30. See id. at 145 (noting that, as of 2000, only two federal court decisions had overturned a
Pinkerton conviction on due process grounds); SANFORD H. KADISH ET AL., CRIMINAL LAW AND
ITS PROCESSES: CASES AND MATERIALS 779 (10th ed. 2017) (noting commonplace application of

Pinkerton liability to "minor players").
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under CIL. 31 The case engages entirely in source-based reasoning with no deontic
analysis, and even its consideration of sources leaves much to be desired. For one,
the Court treats judge-made law from World War II as primary evidence of CIL
without explaining how these sources satisfy the requisite standard of state practice
and opinio juris or considering the risk that that case law may have been biased by
its surrounding context of victor's justice, in which the Allied Powers sat in
judgment of those on the war's losing side. 32 Moreover, the Court glosses over
glaring inconsistencies among the cases that undermine their ability to support a
single CIL standard.
In the British Zyklon B case, for instance, the senior gassing technician at a firm
that supplied Auschwitz's gas chambers was acquitted on the apparent ground that
he lacked sufficient influence over the supply of gas 33 -a fact that the Furundija
Court notes as support for its view that "the relationship between the acts of the
accomplice and of the principal must be such that the acts of the accomplice make a
significant difference to the commission of the criminal act by the principal." 34 But
then we also read about the Synagogue case in which a "long-time militant of the
Nazi party" was convicted based on being an "intermittent" approving spectator to
the destruction of a synagogue "although he had not physically taken part in it, nor
planned or ordered it." 35 The Furundijadecision cites this case approvingly for the
point that spectators may sometimes be accomplices, but it ignores the tension with
the outcome in Zyklon B. 36 So much for making a significant difference. Finally,
there is the Rohde case, in which a concentration camp inmate was convicted of
involvement in the death by lethal injection of four British women prisoners despite
the inmate's only role being his operation-under orders-of the concentration
camp crematorium used to dispose of the dead bodies after the fact.37 The Furundfija
Court analogizes the inmate to a lookout without pausing over the massive difference
in context between that of the Rohde inmate and a typical lookout-a contrast that
speaks directly to the issue of who makes a "significant difference" and who does
not.38

31. Case No. IT-95-17/1-T, Judgment, ¶¶ 190-249 (Int'l Crim. Trib. for the Former
Yugoslavia Dec. 10, 1998).
32. See, e.g., id. ¶ 193 (noting that it is necessary to examine case law because World War IIera legal instruments did very little to define aiding and abetting); see also Greenawalt, Foreign
Assistance Complicity, supra note 13, at 544-63 (exploring these issues, including relevance of
victor's justice).
33. Case No. 9, The Zyklon B Case, TrialofBruno Tesch andTwo Others, in 1 LAW REPORTS
OF TRIALS OF WAR CRIMINALS 93, 102 (U.N. War Crimes Commission ed., 1947).
34. Case No. IT-95-17/1-T, Judgement, ¶ 233.
35. Id. ¶205.
36. See id. ¶ 223 ("This clearly requires that the act of the accomplice has at least a substantial
effect on the principal act .... In other words, mens rea alone is insufficient to ground a criminal
conviction.").
37. Case No. 31, Trial of Werner Rohde andEight Others, in 5 LAW REPORTS OF TRIALS OF

WAR CRIMINALS 54, 54-56 (U.N. War Crimes Commission ed., 1948).
38. See Case No. IT-95-17/1-T, Judgement, ¶ 204 ("The service provided by the cremator
may be analogous to that of the lookout, in that the knowledge that the bodies will be disposed of,
in the same way that the knowledge they will be warned of impending discovery in the lookout
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But the Court's ultimate finding-that aiding and abetting entails the knowing
provision of substantial assistance to a crime 3 9-charts a relatively conventional
approach to accomplice liability. It corresponds, for example, with the International
Law Commission's approach in its 1996 Draft Code of Crimes Against the Peace
and Security of Mankind" and also with the American Law Institute's (ALI) original
proposal for its Model Penal Code before the organization substituted an ostensibly
stricter purpose-based standard." It is an approach that the FurundijaCourt could
have justified by deontic reasoning, and perhaps the judgment actually was the result
of such reasoning notwithstanding the Court's unconvincing appeal to settled CIL. 2
As with JCE, it is no stretch to imagine that the Court covered its tracks with sourcebased analysis precisely in order to maintain the appearance of compliance with the
legality principle. And once again, if the result is appropriate, how much should it
matter that the published reasoning is unsatisfying?
As with JCE, the aiding and abetting case law also exemplifies the limits of
formal doctrine in safeguarding fundamental principles. We may agree generally
that a knowing substantial contribution to a crime should be punishable, but the real
challenge lies in determining how to interpret and apply that standard in concrete
cases. The abstract doctrine is susceptible to both narrow and broad applications,
and my own view-which I have developed in greater detail elsewhere-is that the
doctrine cannot displace the need for case-by-case assessment of blameworthiness
by way of judgments that are not reducible to a doctrinal formula.4 3
The international case law provides an instructive example in the debate over
culpability for government officials accused of aiding and abetting crime by way of
providing cross-border military assistance to non-state groups conducting mass
atrocities. In Prosecutorv. Perisit,the ICTY Appeals Chamber invoked and applied
a widely criticized "specific direction" requirement to acquit the accused-the
former head of the Yugoslav military-on the ground that the assistance he provided

scenario, reassures the killers and facilitates their commission of the crime in some significant
way.").
39. See id. ¶ 249 ("In sum, the Trial Chamber holds the legal ingredients of aiding and abetting
in international criminal law to be the following: the actus reus consists of practical assistance,
encouragement, or moral support which has a substantial effect on the perpetration of the
crime. The mens rea required is the knowledge that these acts assist the commission of the
offence.").
40. See International Law Commission, Draft Code of CrimesAgainst the Peace andSecurity
of Mankind, U.N. Doc. A/51/10(Supp.), ¶ 30, ¶ 50 art. 2(3)(d) (1996) ("An individual shall be
responsible for a crime [listed in the Draft Code] if that individual . . knowingly aids, abets or
otherwise assists, directly and substantially, in the commission of such a crime, including providing
the means for its commission.").
41. See MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.04(3)(b) (AM. LAW INST., Tentative Draft No. 1, 1953) ("A
person is an accomplice of another person in commission of a crime if . .. acting with knowledge
that such other person was committing or had the purpose of committing the crime, he knowingly,
substantially facilitated its commission .... "); see also MODEL PENAL CODE §§ 2.06(3)(a), 2.06
cmt. 6(c) at 315-16 (AM. LAW INST. 1962) (rejecting the knowledge-based approach to accomplice
liability in favor of a purpose-based approach).
42. See Furundzija, Case No. IT-95-17/1-T, Judgement, ¶¶ 236-41 (surveying international
case law for support of its position on aiding and abetting).
43. See generally Greenawalt, ForeignAssistance Complicity, supra note 13.
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to genocidal Bosnian Serb forces took the form of general assistance used both to
commit atrocities and to engage in non-criminal combat actions.4 4 Later ICTY cases
rejected this requirement, 4 5 as did the Special Court for Sierra Leone when it
convicted former Liberian President Charles Taylor on a similar theory of his having
provided essential assistance to the murderous Revolutionary United Front (RUF).4 6
Many people will find it easy to support conviction in cases like Perisit and
Prosecutor v. Taylor, but other examples-the United States' provision of military
assistance to some Syrian rebels and the various goods and services sold by
multinational corporations to human-rights-abusing regimes-raise difficult linedrawing questions. I suspect that most people's intuitions about such cases will turn
on a balance of factors that are not reducible to the simple formulation of knowing
substantial assistance. 4 7 There is a difference, for example, between providing aid to
an armed group that itself is engaged in a JCE to commit atrocities versus one that
is not so engaged, but that remains unable to prevent some misuse of the assistance.
It also matters what precautions, if any, the donor takes to prevent the criminal use
of the aid. As a matter of interpretation, it is possible perhaps to reconcile these and
other factors with the wording of the formal legal standards. It might be that these
or other criteria inform whether or not particular assistance should be considered
"substantial," or they might be central to the question of what it means to "assist" a
crime in the legal sense as opposed to undertaking an action that merely, in some
more remote way, has the side effect of making someone else's crime possible or
easier to carry out. But whatever interpretive work we might do here does not change
the fact that the formal doctrine plays only a partial role in safeguarding and
advancing fundamental principles. At some point, the doctrinal formulas become
silent and case-by-case moral judgment takes over.
The story of aiding and abetting, in sum, is similar to that of JCE. Unsatisfying
source-based analysis produces a doctrinal standard that is familiar outside the
context of ICL. In its bare terms, that standard is susceptible to sweeping
interpretations, threatening commitment to core principles. But such concerns are
premature because the formal doctrine is an inherently imperfect mechanism for
advancing fundamental principles. Equally, if not more, important, is the
interpretation and application of the doctrine in concrete cases.

III. COMMAND RESPONSIBILITY
I turn now to the doctrine that is the primary focus of Robinson's study, the
international criminal standard for command responsibility. Robinson's discussion
of command responsibility is illuminating, and his proposed reform of the doctrine
44. Case No. IT-04-81-A, Judgement, ¶¶ 71-73 (Int'l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia
Feb. 28, 2013).
45. See Prosecutor v. Stanisi6, Case No. IT-03-69-A, Judgement, ¶¶ 103-08 (Int'l Crim. Trib.
for the Former Yugoslavia Dec. 9, 2015) (rejecting "specific direction" as an element of aiding and
abetting); Prosecutor v. Sainovi6, Case No. IT-05-87-A, Judgement, ¶¶ 1649-51 (Int'l Crim. Trib.
for the Former Yugoslavia Jan. 23, 2014) (same).
46. Prosecutorv. Taylor, Case No. SCSL-03-01-A, Judgment, ¶¶ 436-47 (Sept. 26, 2013).
47. See Greenawalt, Foreign Assistance Complicity, supra note 13, at 593-97 (discussing
factors that affect aiding and abetting blameworthiness).
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through integration of a contribution requirement is sensible. 48 I agree-and
Robinson's thorough exploration leads me to agree even more-that the case law
has been a muddle.4 9 But, again, the question of whether and how the existing state
of affairs conflicts with fundamental principles presents some complications that are
worth exploring.
Robinson's key criticism is that the command responsibility doctrine-as
developed principally by the ICTY-violates the culpability principle: in defined
situations, it permits the conviction of a commander for crimes committed by her
subordinates even when the commander did not contribute at all to the perpetration
of those crimes. 50 This possibility is starkest in cases where the commander's
responsibility rests solely on a post hoc failure to punish the subordinates absent
evidence either that the commander should have prevented the crimes, or that the
failure to punish them encouraged the perpetration of additional subsequent
crimes." The point is not that criminal liability is per se inappropriate in such cases.
As Robinson observes, if international law were to treat irresponsible command as
a separate offense-as some states, in fact, do-then "the concerns about culpability
would be resolved."5 2 The problem, as Robinson elaborates, lies with treating the
mere failure to punish a crime as a form of accessorial participation in that
underlying crime. The result is a contradictory jurisprudence that "(i) recognizes the
principle of personal culpability, pursuant to which a person must contribute to a
crime to be party to it, and yet (ii) uses command responsibility to declare persons
party to international crimes without a causal contribution." 3
I agree with and am convinced by Robinson's core observation about such
cases. Given the opportunity to re-draft tribunal statutes, Robinson's analysis
provides a compelling case for reform. But the problem is that international judges
do not have that luxury. Take, for instance, Article 7 of the Statute of the ICTY,
stating that:
[t]he fact that any of the acts [prohibited by] the present Statute was
committed by a subordinate does not relieve his superior of criminal
responsibility if he knew or had reason to know that the subordinate was
about to commit such acts or had done so and the superior failed to take
the necessary and reasonable measures to prevent such acts or to punish
the perpetrators thereof."
The phrasing of this article is inartful to say the least-read literally, it seems to treat
command responsibility as a possible affirmative defense rather than as a mode of

48. See ROBINSON, supra note 1, at 174-76 (defending contribution requirement to establish
command responsibility).
49. See id. at 169 ("Tribunal judgments began to include muddled and self-contradictory
statements about the nature of command responsibility.").
50. See id at 152 (stating that tribunal jurisprudence does not apply the contribution
requirement to command responsibility).
51. See id. at 155-56 (discussing scenarios that present the possibility of command
responsibility when commander did not contribute to the crime).
52. Id. at 164.
53. Id. at 143.
54. ICTY Statute, supra note 12, art. 7(3).
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liability-but the implication is reasonably clear: liability can attach to a commander
not merely for failing to prevent crimes but also for failing to punish crimes she
learned about or should have learned about after the fact.55 A judge enforcing that
statute in a failure-to-punish case now has two basic choices for protecting
fundamental principles. Option 1 is to safeguard the culpability principle and
promote fair labeling by reading a contribution requirement into the statute. But this
solution-favored by Robinson5 6 -then risks impunity for a group of serious
offenders: namely, those who culpably fail to punish subordinate crimes but do not
otherwise contribute to the crimes. These commanders are culpable both in the sense
that they have helped the crime succeed-whether or not "accessory" is actually the
right label-and in the sense that they are engaging in culpable risk-taking behavior.
Just like drunk drivers engage in culpable risk creation even if no one is harmed, so
too do commanders whose failure to punish creates a risk of future subordinate
crimes even if no such crimes transpire.
Option 2 is to enforce the statute as written with no contribution requirement.
The result is that the statute authorizes the punishment of a class of persons for whom
punishment is morally justifiable, but the statute does so in the wrong way, treating
them as participants in crimes to which they did not contribute. But the matter need
not end there for reasons similar to those I have explored with JCE and aiding and
abetting. A judge pursuing this second interpretive option is free to explain the ways
in which the commander's culpability is materially different from that of a typical
accomplice and to take full account of that fact when imposing a sentence.57
Option 2 is not a perfect solution. The best solution is clearer statutory language
that appropriately distinguishes the different types of cases. At the same time, the
availability of Option 2 calls into question both the necessity and the desirability of
Option 1. Is Option 1 truly required to realize fundamental principles? Or is it an
overly formalistic response that needlessly denies punishment authorized by the
statute to persons who are morally deserving? For Robinson, the problem with
Option 2 is that by effectively treating command responsibility as a separate offense,
"it is an implausible departure from the applicable law of the Tribunals (and the
ICC), and hence it is a change that should not be made by judicial fiat, but rather by
lawmakers (legislators or treaty drafters), if it must be made."5 8 The point is well
taken, but its implications are less clear for a case such as this one where the object
of judicial innovation is not to expand liability but instead to restrain the statute by
avoiding the violation of fundamental principles that would result from giving the
text its most natural reading. The Option 1 alternative of adding a contribution
requirement arguably reflects an even starker act of judicial fiat by completely
eliminating-rather than merely recharacterizing-a form of liability that the statute
imposes.
55. Id.
56. See ROBINSON, supra note 1, at 145 (proposing a contribution requirement for command
responsibility).
57. But see id. at 252 ("However, adopting overbroad doctrines with the sanguine reliance on
prosecutorial or judicial discretion to avoid their excess is problematic, because it allows a 'rule of
officials' rather than a 'rule of law."').
58. Id. at 165.
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Although Robinson is highly protective of the culpability principle in the failure
to punish context, he is notably more relaxed about the more typical scenario in
which a commander faces punishment for a culpable failure to prevent a
subordinate's crime. Robinson devotes a separate chapter to justifying the
punishment of commanders based on a negligent failure to prevent subordinate
crimes. 59 The key distinction in this case is that such negligent failures will typically
satisfy Robinson's concerns about contribution in that the commander's failure will
have had the effect of facilitating the offense. Nevertheless, such cases raise very
similar concerns to the failure-to-punish scenario in that they arguably involve
punishing a commander for a more serious offense than the one they are responsible
for committing. If command responsibility is truly in all cases a mode of
participation in the underlying crime, then the commander will be guilty of murder
on grounds of having negligently failed to prevent a subordinate from committing
murder.
Among Robinson's important contributions on this topic, two points stand out.
One observation is that criminally negligent commanders are not always less
culpable than those who are reckless or those who know of their subordinates'
crimes. 60 He argues, for example, that "[a] negligently ignorant commander, who
cares so little about the danger to civilians that she does not bother with even thefirst
step of monitoring, actually shows greater contempt than the commander who
monitors and learns of a risk, but hopes it will not materialize." 61 I agree, but such
contrasts are not unique to command responsibility. A school bus driver who
habitually transports young children while heavily intoxicated resulting in fatal
consequences will be considered by many to be morally worse than the person who
purposefully acts to end the life of a beloved parent in order to spare the parent the
pain of a terminal disease. Such cases reinforce the point that there are limits to the
formal doctrinal categories. But so long as criminal law maintains the general
distinction between mental states based on their value in most cases, I do not see
how command responsibility presents a unique exception. Robinson's example does
not suggest that negligent commanders are generally more culpable than other
blameworthy commanders. In addition to the commander who hopes a known risk
will not materialize, there is also the commander who knows but does not care, or
who remains passive in the hopes that the risk will materialize. Assuming, as I do,
that these are the more typical cases, a better result would be to treat the negligent
commander as guilty of a lesser offense such as negligent homicide, yet achieving
that result within the confines of existing law would also require the same sort of
judicial maneuvering that I explored with Option 2 in the failure-to-punish
scenarios. 62

59. Id. at 194-223.
60. Id. at 198.
61. Id.
62. For instance, the Statute of the International Criminal Court speaks of a culpable
commander being "criminally responsible for crimes within the jurisdiction of the Court committed
by subordinates." See Rome Statute, supra note 26, art. 28(b). That language suggests that the
commander is guilty of the particular crime committed by the subordinate and not some other crime.
Moreover, negligent homicide does not appear on the list of offenses punishable by the Court.
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Robinson's second point about negligence rests on a distinction between
principals and accessories considering that the latter bear a "diminished level of
blame."6 3 He writes that "[c]ommand responsibility is a mode of accessory liability"
and that "it is not problematic, or even unusual, that an accessory does not satisfy
the dolus specialis, or 'special intent,' required for the principal's crime." 64 In this
way, extended liability associated with command responsibility marks a contrast to
the extended JCE-III doctrine which remains problematic because JCE-III is a form
of principal culpability.6 5 Certainly, this is one way to distinguish between principals
and accomplices, and Robinson's observation about accomplices and mens rea finds
support in the ICL case law which he cites.66 But as I have already explained, it is
hardly universal or necessary to imbue the principal/accessory distinction with this
degree of moral significance. One might also look to the example of the influential
Model Penal Code, which rejects the practice of convicting accomplices based on a
lower mens rea than that required of principals. 61 The Code requires that an
accomplice act with a purpose to promote or assist the commission of an offense
and, further, that "[w]hen causing a particular result is an element of an offense, an
accomplice in the conduct causing such result is an accomplice in the commission
of that offense if he acts with the kind of culpability, if any, with respect to that result
that is sufficient for the commission of the offense." 68
My point here is not that the Model Penal Code's approach is preferable to
Robinson's account of command responsibility. To the contrary, I have argued that
there are different ways of achieving fundamental principles and that the formal
liability labels are only one, incomplete part of the solution. For instance, even if
one embraces Robinson's view about negligent commanders, not all command
responsibility cases will involve the same diminished culpability, as some
commanders will reflect far more culpability than others. Further work is then
required to distinguish these different commanders whom the law treats as
accessories. Rather than attach decisive significance to the principal/accomplice
distinction, I would argue that the various issues related to both command
responsibility and JCE-III involve similar problems and solutions and do not admit
of clear-cut distinctions.
Moving beyond these questions related to causal contribution, the law of
command responsibility provides yet one more example of the limits of formal
doctrine in safeguarding fundamental principles. While Robinson's proposed
reforms emphasize clear doctrinal lines with respect to mens rea and causal

Hence, any judicial innovation along the lines I am suggesting would most plausibly take place
through judicial elaboration and characterization rather than changes to the formal charges.
63. ROBINSON, supra note 1, at 213.
64. Id. at 209.
65. See id. at 212 ("The extended form ('JCE-III') is rightly criticized for imposing principal
liability without meeting the culpability requirements for principal liability. But command
responsibility is accessory liability and thus does not require paradigmatic mens rea.").
66. See id. at 211 (citing multiple ICTY and ICTR cases to support his argument that
accomplice mens rea need not meet the same requirements as that of the principal).
67. MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.06(4) (AM. LAW INST. 1985).
68. Id.
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contribution, other-perhaps more difficult-questions surround the determination
of what sorts of contributions count, and who should be seen as negligent. Consider,
for example, the case of a head of state, who, acting in her capacity as commanderin-chief, makes a decision to deploy her country's armed forces in an armed conflict.
In the case of any sufficiently substantial conflict, she knows that, no matter what
precautions she or anyone else takes, some of her subordinates will end up
committing some war crimes at some point. These crimes could be prevented by
refusing to engage in armed conflict in the first place, yet we do not conceptualize
that decision alone-the decision to resort to war-as a culpable failure to prevent
crimes. Doctrinally (and putting aside the questions of whether the use of armed
force is otherwise lawful), the head of state's decision presents no deviation from
the standard of reasonable preventative measures expected of a commander. We also
might say that the causal contribution to future crime is too attenuated to qualify as
culpable contribution.
This example is an easy one, but others will present more difficult problems of
line-drawing. It is for this reason, perhaps, that the ICTY's Celebitijudgment, whose
reasoning Robinson subjects to persuasive criticism, 69 declined to acknowledge
command responsibility based on a commander's general failure to put in place an
adequate system of reporting. 70 It may help here to distinguish two different
scenarios. One is the case of the isolated bad commander working within a good
system. The doctrine of command responsibility seems tailor-made for these
circumstances as the bad commander's deviation from expected standards will be
relatively easy to establish. But the more difficult case is that of the good
commander, fighting perhaps for a good cause but within a bad or dysfunctional
system. How much time is the commander required to spend in a perhaps fruitless
attempt to fix the system rather than performing other functions? The risk is that a
court will unfairly punish individuals for what are, in fact, collective failures. As
with aiding and abetting, the doctrinal formulas provide guidance, but they must
work alongside less determinate moral judgments.
IV. CONCLUSION

Darryl Robinson's important and compelling book marks a significant
contribution to the literature on ICL, and these brief remarks cannot do justice to the
many insights provided by his rich and careful analysis. Robinson provides a
roadmap for better reasoned judicial opinions alongside concrete proposals whose
adoption would improve the law. My own modest critiques do not detract from that
achievement but instead seek to highlight some complexities in the assessment of
how fundamental principles are protected and advanced. I have argued that there are
different doctrinal pathways for safeguarding core values, but also that formal
doctrinal standards play an inherently limited, albeit important, role in this project.

69. See ROBINSON, supra note 1, at 200-05.
70. Case No. IT-96-21-A, Judgement, ¶ 226 (Int'l Crim. Trib. for the Fonner Yugoslavia Feb.
20, 2001).

